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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
admitting fatally prejudicial medical records which recited an 
unreliable hearsay statement? Questions as to the admissibility of 
evidence are governed by the abuse of discretion standard. Pearce 
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE II: Did Hansen adequately preserve her objection to the 
hearsay in the medical records and in the testimony of Dr. Freedman 
by means of pre-trial motions and in-chambers evidentiary hearings? 
It is for this Court to determine whether an issue has been 
adequately raised in the trial court for consideration of the issue 
on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983). 
ISSUE III: Was the speculation of Dr. Freedman regarding an 
alleged blackout of Mr. Woo inadmissible, and did its admission 
constitute fatal error? Questions as to the admissibility of 
evidence are governed by the abuse of discretion standard. Pearce 
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 7 03: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the 
hearing- If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (4): 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the 
inception or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (6): 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis, 
made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, 
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or 
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack 
of trustworthiness. The term "business" us used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, 
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 
whether or not conducted for profit. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805 
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the 
hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements 
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided 
in these rules. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff and appellant Gail 0. Hansen ("Ms. Hansen") brought 
this action in the Third Judicial District Court to recover 
compensation for injuries she sustained as a result of an 
automobile collision. Ms. Hansen's vehicle was struck from behind 
by a vehicle driven by James Woo ("Woo") , who died during the 
pendency of this action of causes unrelated to the collision. (R. 
at 3, 12, 97-99.) The case resulted in a jury verdict of no cause 
of action. (R. 463-464.) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the statement of 
facts from her priniple brief as if fully set forth. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant Gail O. Hansen respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the judgment entered against her and remand for a 
new trial, because the trial court erred in admitting impermissible 
hearsay evidence addressing the cause of the collision, through 
medical records and speculative medical testimony based upon this 
hearsay. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
INADMISSABLE HEARSAY ADMITTED TO PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIAL 
PREJUDICE: The hearsay statement reportedly made by the defendant, 
that he had suffered a momentary black-out, was first made long 
after the collision, so as to raise grave suspicions of fabrication 
or misstatement. Defendant's ambiguous statement, as reported in 
the medical records, is impermissible hearsay because it was not 
within any exception to the hearsay rule and thus the trial court 
should have excluded it. If this hearsay statement, and all 
speculation based upon it, were properly excluded, then likewise, 
the medical testimony of Dr. Freedman about the alleged blackout 
should properly have been excluded so as to avoid allowing in 
inadmissible hearsay and speculation regarding the alleged black-
out. 
POINT I. 
THE HEARSAY IN WOO'S MEDICAL RECORDS RELATING 
TO HIS ALLEGED BLACK-OUT IS INADMISSIBLE 
AND ITS ADMISSIONS RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL 
PREJUDICE TO HANSEN, AND WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
To make Defendant Woo's hearsay statement admissible for its 
truth, defendant must establish that the statement came within one 
of the narrow exceptions to the hearsay rule. Hansen has 
discussed, in her principle brief, the reasons why the statement 
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does not come within the exception offered by Rule 803 (4) of the 
Utah Rule of Evidence ("U.R.E."), which allows hearsay statements 
which were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. In 
this section she will briefly respond to the arguments raised by 
defendant as to why he believes this exception should apply. 
Further, Hansen will reply to defendant's arguments that Rule 803 
(6) of the U.R.E. should be applicable to allow the records at 
issue into evidence. 
A. The Statement Allegedly Made by Woo Was Not 
For Purposes of Diagnosis or Treatment, But 
Was Merely Exculpatory, and So It Should Not 
Be Allowed Into Evidence Under Rule 803 (4) 
The hearsay statement allegedly made by Woo nearly an hour 
after the collision, at the hospital, appears on its face as an 
attempt to explain what had happened, rather than a statement to a 
medical professional for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 12, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "A", reflects that Woo reportedly stated that "he was 
driving and suddenly lost consciousness [without] warning. 
Remembers nothing until a lady was pulling him from his car." 
This statement, on its face, appears to be a response to a 
question such as "what happened?" or "how did this collision 
occur?" An answer to this type of question does not qualify as a 
statement to a medical professional for purposes of diagnosis or 
treatment, and the trial court should properly have excluded it. 
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Numerous courts have interpreted rules of evidence in other 
jurisdictions which are identical to Utahfs Rule 803 (4) not to 
allow statements made for the purpose of explaining the cause of 
the injury or incriminating the person or force responsible for the 
accident. In addition to those cases and authorities cited in 
Hansen's principle brief, the case of Hatfield v. Andermatt, 561 
N.E.2d 1023 (Ohio App. 1988) is relevant. In Hatfield the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, in interpreting Ohio's version of Rule 803 (4), 
held that a "statement in a hospital or emergency squad record 
regarding the cause of the injury or the manner in which the 
accident happened are not admissible insofar as they are not 
pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient, [emphasis 
added.]" Id. at 1026. (citing McQueen v. Goldey 484 N.E.2d 712 
(Ohio App. 1984)). 
The rationale underlying the exception found at Rule 803 (4) 
is stated to be the presumption that "the particular facts relied 
on will be trustworthy because the integrity and specialized skill 
of the expert will keep him or her from basing his or her opinion 
on questionable matter. The right to cross-examine the expert 
reinforces the probability of reliability." State v. Schreuder, 
726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) (commenting on Rule 703 and Rule 803 
(4)). 
The rationale stated by the Schreuder court is inapplicable 
here. The expert who testified at the trial, Dr. Freedman, was not 
the doctor (expert) who had examined Woo, treated him and recorded 
his hearsay statement. Dr. Freedman had never seen nor treated 
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Woo. He was hired by the defendant merely to review the medical 
records and determine whether the alleged "black-out," assuming it 
occurred, was foreseeable. The first premise of the rationale 
stated by the Schreuder Court is inapplicable where the testifying 
expert is not the doctor (expert) who treated and assessed the 
hearsay declarant, and recorded the hearsay statement. For this 
reason, Schreuder is not persuasive here. 
Defendant, in his brief, insinuates that Hansen could have 
called Dr. Scovill, Woo's treating physician and allegedly the 
person who recorded the hearsay statement. Dr. Scovill was unable 
to testify at trial. Defense counsel Roger Bullock was unsuccesful 
in his attempts to locate Dr. Scovill, and thus was forced to hire 
Dr. Freedman. 
Consequently, Hansen had no opportunity to call and incisively 
cross-examine Dr. Scovill as to the exact nature of the statement 
which she allegedly heard from Woo, and so the second premise of 
the rationale proposed by the Schreuder court is inapplicable also. 
Cross-examination of a "second hand" expert who is unfamiliar with 
the patient and his communication abilities and difficulties cannot 
replace the right to question either the hearsay declarant, Woo, 
or, at the least, Dr. Scovill, who recorded the hearsay. 
Naturally, it follows that where the elements of the rationale for 
Rule 803 (4) under Schreuder are not applicable, the trial court 
should not have admitted the challenged evidence under Rule 803(4). 
The hospital records which contain the hearsay and speculation 
regarding Woo's alleged "black-out" are inadmissible and the trial 
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court should not have allowed them to come into evidence. This 
error completely foreclosed Hansen's recovery for her injuries 
occasioned by Woo's negligence- Their admission clearly is 
reversible error as they worked a fatal prejudice to Hansen's 
rights. 
B. The Records Containing Woo's Hearsay 
Statements Are Not Admissible Under Rule 803 
(6) as the Source of the Information Contained 
Therein Indicates A Lack of Trustworthiness 
In his brief, defendant raises the argument that the 
questioned hospital records should be admissible pursuant to U,R,E. 
Rule 803 (6). This rule allows regularly kept records of a 
business, here a hospital, to be admissible despite the hearsay 
rule. Defendant argues that the requirements of Rule 803 (6) are 
met, in that Dr. Freedman was a "qualified witness" to testify that 
the records were "kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity" to make those records. (See Rule 803 (6)). It 
is arguable, however, that a doctor from one hospital is 
"qualified" to authenticate another hospital's records. 
Beyond the question of whether defendant laid a proper 
foundation under Rule 803 (6), clearly the court should not have 
permitted these records under provision (6) of Rule 803, which 
provides that if the "source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness" the 
records should be excluded, even if they are otherwise business 
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records as defined by Rule 803 (6) . In the instant case, there is 
obvious "lack of trustworthiness" in the "source of information or 
the method or circumstances of preparation". 
As discussed at length in Hansen's principle brief, Woo was 
elderly, somewhat infirm and not fluent in English. He was 
suffering from the shock and confusion of a severe automobile 
collision when he allegedly made his statement, almost one hour 
after the collision. One hour is ample time in which to fabricate 
an explanation for his negligence. Clearly these facts taken 
together constitute a "lack of trustworthiness" in the "source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation". 
Compounding the fact that the accuracy in the transmission of 
the statement was questionable, there is the fact that only Dr. 
Scovill, the treating physician, knew if the remark was in response 
to a question. Only Dr. Scovill could assess whether the "failure 
to remember" anything was a result of retrograde amnesia 
attributable to the crash, or reflected a momentary distraction 
because of Woo's other health problems, or arose from any of a 
myriad of other reasons. In any of these instances, Woo would be 
liable and Hansen would recover. 
Because of the unavailability of Dr. Scovill, the hearsay 
remark is hearsay within hearsay, or double hearsay — Woo's 
alleged statement as one level of hearsay, and Dr. Scovillfs 
recordation of the statement in the medical records as the second 
level. Neither of the hearsay declarants was available to be put 
under oath, or cross-examined on the details of Woo's statements. 
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Rule 805 of the U.R.E. allows that "[hjearsay included within 
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the 
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule 
provided in these rules." [Emphasis added.] Assuming arguendo 
that the hearsay from Dr. Scovill was admissible, Woo's self-
serving statements were not. Consequently, the trial court should 
have excluded the hearsay and speculation in the medical records 
about Woo's alleged "black-out" should have been excluded. The 
trial court's failure to exclude this evidence constitutes 
reversible error. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO WAIVER OF OBJECTION WHERE PLAINTIFF MADE 
A MOTION IN LIMINE FOR A RULING ON THE QUESTIONED 
EVIDENCE, AND WHERE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS HELD 
BEFORE THE JUDGE WHICH PRESIDED OVER THE TRIAL 
Defendant cites a number of cases for the proposition that an 
objection to evidence must be raised at trial or be waived. 
Plaintiff does not dispute this. Plaintiff does dispute 
defendant's contention that a pre-trial motion is inadequate to 
preserve a party's objection to evidence. The rule from the case 
cited by defendant as support for this proposition, State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), was limited by this Court to 
situations wherein the party made a pre-trial motion to exclude 
evidence before a law and motion judge, and then failed to raise 
the same objection later, before the trial judge. State v. 
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Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1987). (See also State v. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 1988).) 
Defendant also cites Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 
832 (Utah 1984) as support for his argument that plaintiff waived 
her objection to the disputed evidence. Barson is distinguishable 
in that the party objecting to the evidence based his objection on 
one ground, but failed to adequately raise an argument as to the 
other ground before the trial court. Consequently, the trial court 
did not have an opportunity to rule with finality on that issue, so 
an appeal could not be predicated on that basis. 
This Court's rule in Johnson is controlling. The facts of the 
instant case reflect that Plaintiff Hansen made numerous pre-trial 
motions, including a Motion to Strike [R. 100-114], a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment [R.275-319] (which Motion was admittedly 
not considered by the Court due to Rule 4-501 (3) (g) of the Code 
of Judicial Administration) and a Motion in Limine [R. 336-353], 
all before the trial judge. Plaintiff obtained rulings on the 
challenged evidence from the trial court. Consequently, 
plaintiff's objections to the records containing the inadmissible 
hearsay, and to the speculations in Dr. Freedman's testimony, are 
preserved. 
Beyond the fact that plaintiff adequately preserved her 
objections by means of a pre-trial Motion to Strike, Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine, plaintiff reasserted 
her objections during the trial, at evidentiary hearings in 
chambers. [R. 485-494, 555-559] In a conference before the trial 
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judge on April 1, 1992, the second day of the trial, plaintiff's 
counsel argued and offered supporting authorities for the 
proposition that "the Interrogatories...and the Declaration of Mr. 
Woo do not fit under any exception to the hearsay rule". [R. 485-
486] Further, on April 2, 1992, plaintiff's counsel again argued 
the trial court must exclude the testimony of Dr. Freedman and the 
references to an alleged "black-out." He argued such testimony 
and/or references to questionable statements should not be allowed 
"to come in through the [hospital] records that the Defendant 
stated at the hospital to someone that he had experienced a sudden 
loss of consciousness." [R. 555] On both occassions, plaintiff's 
counsel went on to argue that the hearsay exceptions discussed in 
the briefs before this Court do not permit admission of such 
speculative and questionable hearsay. 
It is abundantly clear that plaintiff repeatedly reaffirmed 
her objection to the "black out" hearsay statements of Woo and to 
the speculative medical testimony arising from this hearsay. The 
trial court admitted the evidence, and in so doing fataly 
prejudiced Hansen's rights. This Court needs to rectify these 
errors by a reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial. 
POINT III. 
THE INADMISSIBLE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL 
HEARSAY CONTAINED IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO BE 
REPEATED FOR ITS TRUTH BY DR. FREEDMAN 
The error of which plaintiff complains, the admission of 
highly prejudicial hearsay, was not harmless error. If the trial 
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court had correctly ruled on plaintiff's objections to the hearsay 
statements, then necessarily the court would have needed to 
reconsider plaintiff's objection to the testimony of Dr. Freedman. 
An order should properly have been issued excluding any speculative 
opinion based on assumptions derived from the inadmissible hearsay, 
as discussed below. 
To prevail on appeal plaintiff must show: 1. that the error 
complained of was substantial and prejudicial error; and 2. that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different without it. (See Bowden v. Denver and R.G.W.R.R., 2 68 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1965).) Plaintiff has certainly established the 
substantial and prejudicial nature of the error, in that it 
precluded plaintiff's constitutional right to cross-examination and 
this was fatal to plaintiff's entire claim. The conclusion that 
the result would have been different without the disputed evidence 
is inescapable. Considering the fact that without the hearsay in 
the medical records, and without the speculative testimony of Dr. 
Freedman arising directly and improperly from that hearsay, there 
would have been no defense to Hansen's claims, thus Hansen would 
have prevailed. 
It is true that U.R.E. Rule 703 allows an expert to base his 
opinions on evidence which need not be admissible in evidence. One 
must approach this rule with caution, however, to avoid 
eviscerating the purpose and intent of the hearsay rule by allowing 
all hearsay and other inadmissible evidence to come into evidence 
through expert testimony. Experts, by virtue of the fact that they 
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are knowledgeable in a particular field and well educated, are 
generally accorded great respect by the jury. In most cases their 
opinions are given more weight than the opinions of lay witnesses. 
If experts are allowed unrestricted license to base opinions on 
otherwise inadmissible evidence, and to state to the jury the 
foundations for those opinions, it is highly likely that a jury 
will accept the expert's opinions. In such a case impermissible, 
highly prejudicial hearsay evidence will be the primary evidence 
upon which the jury bases its decision, as occurred in this case. 
The text of Rule 703 provides that an expert may base his 
opinions upon inadmissible matter if "of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field". Dr. Freedman testified 
that his opinions were based on the sort of records and materials 
of the type reasonably relied upon by physicians. [R. 506] It has 
been held, however, that the question of "[w]hether the underlying 
evidence is reasonably relied on for purposes of rule 703 is an 
issue for the trial judge. The expert's own testimony regarding 
reasonable reliance is not conclusive, being only on factor in the 
consideration." Brunner v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Iowa 1992). 
(Citing D. Binder Hearsay Handbook, § 103 at 457 (1983); Supp. at 
267.) (Accord City of Chicago v. Anthony. 554 N.E.2d 1381, 1388 
(111. 1990); Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd,, et al., 505 F.Supp 1313, 1325 (D.C. Penn, 
1981).) 
In this case, the underlying evidence which led to Dr. 
Freedman1s opinion regarding the alleged "black-out" was of highly 
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questionable origin, considering the circumstances under which it 
was made. It is for the Court to determine whether, under all the 
circumstances, it was reasonable for Dr. Freedman to rely on this 
questionable evidence in reaching his opinion. 
The court in Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd., et al., 505 F.Supp 1313 (D.C. Penn, 1981) 
delineated six factors which should go into determining whether the 
expert reasonably relied on otherwise inadmissible materials in 
reaching his opinion. Id at 13 30. When these factors are 
referenced against the facts of this case, it becomes apparent that 
Dr. Freedman1s reliance on the otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
statements of Woo was not reasonable, thus his testimony relating 
to Woo's alleged "black-out" was inadmissible. The six factors are 
the extent to which: 
1. The opinion is dominated by reliance on materials 
judicially determined to be inadmissible. If the court had 
correctly ruled on Hansen's objection to the admissibility of the 
medical records containing Woo's hearsay statement, Dr. Freedman's 
testimony with regard to Woo's alleged "black-out" would have been 
based almost exclusively on materials which had been judicially 
determined to be inadmissible; 
2. The opinion is dominated by reliance upon other 
untrustworthy materials. The remainder of Dr. Freedman's testimony 
regarding the alleged "black-out" would have necessarily been based 
on untrustworthy speculation after the exclusion of the hearsay in 
the medical records; 
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3. The expert's assumptions have been shown to be 
unsupported or speculative. Dr. Freedman repeatedly stated in 
deposition testimony that he was merely "assuming he [Woo] blacked 
out," and that he was then asked, based upon this assumption, 
whether "there was any way of anticipating that." [R. 342, 347] 
It is evident under point three that Dr. Freedman's "assumptions 
have been shown to be unsupported [or] speculative"; 
4. The materials on which the expert relied are within his 
immediate sphere of expertise. It is conceded that Dr. Freedman is 
an expert in the field of heart disorders and arrhythmias, but 
nowhere in his testimony or credentials does he claim to specialize 
in syncopathic episodes like that alleged here, other than when 
they arise from heart disorders. While this clearly does not 
disqualify Dr. Freedman as an expert to testify to such matters, it 
does go to consideration raised by the Court in Zenith as to 
whether the matters testified to were within his immediate sphere 
of expertise; 
5. The expert acknowledges the questionable reliability of 
the underlying information, indicating he has factored that into 
his consideration (the court noted in a footnote that this factor 
would be used only in close cases, as a true "hired gun" could 
always surmount it) . Since this point is only to be used in 
limited cases, it is not considered here; 
6. Reliance on certain materials, which might otherwise be 
reasonable, would be unreasonable on the facts of the particular 
case. As discussed at length above, the hearsay statements of Woo 
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are of questionable veracity, and they were fatally damaging to 
Hansen's case. When taken in the context of speculation as to 
whether Woo did in fact suffer a "black-out," reliance on this sort 
of self-serving, exculpatory statement is unreasonable. 
When the factors stated by the Zenith court are considered, it 
is clear that the hearsay statements relied upon by Dr. Freedman in 
reaching his opinions were not "reasonably relied upon," and should 
therefore not be considered within U.R.E. Rule 703. Consequently, 
the trial court should have excluded the testimony of Dr. Freedman 
speculating as to whether Woo suffered a "black-out" and whether 
any such "black-out" was foreseeable. Hansen respectfully requests 
this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand 
the case for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial because: 
1. Erroneously admitted evidence is an adequate grounds upon 
which to base a reversal, since the evidence "had a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict"; 
2. The hearsay statement of Defendant Woo was inadmissible. 
It did not come within the exceptions provided by either Rule 803 
(4) or 803 (6); 
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3. Hansen did not waive her objection to the evidence where 
it was timely and specifically objected to both before and during 
trial; 
4. The trial court should have excluded the speculations of 
Dr. Freedman's testimony, as it was based on inadmissible hearsay. 
The trial court should not have allowed this hearsay into evidence 
by an alternate means when it should properly have been excluded in 
all respects. 
Respectfully submitted this > day of November, 1992. £L 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
John farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Gail 0. Hansen 
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Addendum to V A Form 10-10 and 10-1 Or 
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE 
Patient Telephone #: 
#-sa 
PORTANT: History, and physical findings must be recorded in sufficient detail to support the diagnosis 
MS-ft & B- D ' 
5. ON ARRIVAL. VETERAN *AS. 
•
AMBU- f—I 
LATORY L J S T R e T C W e R 
JEL WMEEL-
[ I CMAIR 
6. IS APPLICATION THE RESULT OP INJURY? 
(It "Yea*' gire date and cause) 
S NO D »M 
.POSSIBLE EXPOSURE (Check texfes). E. OTHER (5prcf/yj 
>; m u A 3 n c f a - P > , C n c O f U * j U N Q N E U HERBICIDES [ J RADIATION U ^ B E S T O S _ L J _ 
Hccharct STtxtej /IA c^t*J CJ^LCXAC,^ 
T L ^ _ 
a.r. /k^ux ffede /i7j Cfrf (TOJRW ¥IC srucLL-u-
 } Jr^rUrl crfty> /WSK*.- «-^/~; rrrx\KiH t'rh-, 
uft tUArrf. C'^nexrriAXjiA^ktK nnrcxwJKi ci*r<cvt. . fit A/O h,* \i>(K c LJ Of P. /*&*%&»-"-
HYSICAL. EXAMINATION ' J A. HEIGHT ' • B. WEIGHT . I C. TEMPERATURE • O. PULSE • E. RESPIRATION ! F. BiQfln PRPCSUR t  I I  J LOOO ES E 
g ) c rrdr„r,^ (LS &AAJ*. f *«Ati Oni _C±sk 
~k*& yi &S J-*<X. rraddt, h*Mi. SJ, ^ U w . Aau» tin. 
PtirL frcA^/u 0 OLPXHC ^rtthtUj 
ATV2.S Jla*i XX. *frtAi<ik -till, Aiflfrtrlr AtMi f D w W i - £ » , 
rdi- n* pne,i/rwit OH-T• / U T ^ M / T / J - fI,Ai~ fn C*. } CCIA* dx*r C3-
(Continue on rererme) 
AGNOaS: 
0MMCNOATIONS: (Include mny me CCO & indicated procedure*, medication; dmi, or other 
fottowup tnetrucuona) 
kdmi tWD: 
)8XB!. 
LABORATORY 
X-RAY 
EKG 
OTHER 
. to O n . 
Icheduled Surgery Date: 
11. VETERAN'S PHYSICAL STATUS (Check mpprvpriate columns) 
A. CAW DRESS AND USE TOILET F A d L I T l E S WITHOUT ASSISTANCE 
& CAN CO OP AND DOWN STAIRS 
C. CAN FEED SELF WITHOUT ASSISTANCE 
D. 13 CONTPfENT 
E. IS MENTALLY COMPETENT 
F. IS AMBULATORY (Omit i( Item So, ia checked) 
G. IS NOT AMBULATORY BUT CAN USE A WHEELCHAIR 
H. NEEDS AN ATTENDANT DURING TRAVEL 
L HAS A RELATIVE FOR AN ATTENDANT 
YES NO 
SIGNATURE ANO A OOP. ESS OF NQN.VA PHYSICIAN 128. PHONE NO. J. MODE OF TRAVEL (Fill in il apecaol trmnoportaOon to rehired) 
Patient's Condition on Discharge: 
12C. OATE 
ACTION INDICATEO (To be completed by VA Personnel) 
3SPITALI2ATION 
MERGENT L i URGENT 
kOMlT L j 
L J GENERAL L I NOT REQUIRED 
PLACE IN PBC STATUS L J SCHEDULE 
UTPATIENT TREATMENT 
ED [ j SUR Q PSY L J OENT L J NOT REQUIRED 
JIREO TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR HOSPITALIZATION? [ j Y ES 
OMIT TO CARE L J W E F J ^ J O COMM. SOURCES f'grfjfgf^ 
D' 
F l OOMICILIARY CARE D »*€D» ***•_ | MED. INELIG. 
r" | NUWSING HOME CARE REQUIRED Dye* D 
nj( CocL-tS 
17. SIGNATURE OF VA OFFICIAL 
